Binary measure coded "1" if a rebel group inflicts the greatest number of casualties on the government relative to other groups in a multi-party conflict, and "0" otherwise. If the rebel group is the only group fighting the state, it is automatically coded the main group. To generate a number of casualties, we consult the number of battle-related deaths listed in the UCDP conflict encyclopedia. 
Robustness Checks
Tables 2, 3 and 5 show the robustness of our main results when we utilize different operationalizations of different control variables, including an aggregated measure for autocracy, disaggregated and lagged measures for state elections and disaggregated and lagged measures for state leadershipturnover.
In Table 4 lagged dependent variables (LDV) are included to alleviate concerns about temporal dependence, or more specifically that the values of the dependent variable are determined by its prior values. Particularly, if lagged dependent variables are part of the data generating process such that demands at time t are a function of demands at t-1, for example, our results are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias 1 . To address this concern, and to show that our results are robust to the inclusion of LDV's, we respecify all of our models to include past values of rebels demands up to three months prior. In all of these models our results remain consistent. Figure 1 plots the number of demands issued by the different organizations in our sample over the course of their conflicts. The x-axis represents the number of months in a given conflict, which corresponds to a different temporal domain for each group. Since rebels can fight a minimum of one month, and the maximum duration of a conflict in this sample is 192 months, the x-axis spans 0-200 months. For example, month "1" would be coded in September 1990 if a rebel group started a 24-month conflict that month. Accordingly, the value "24" would correspond to the month the conflict ended, September 1992.
As reflected in Figure 1 , rebels' demands change frequently in our sample. The figure also demonstrates that once rebels do make an initial demand, or overcome the "hurdle" of making demands, they are likely to continue doing so. Additionally, we observe in the data that substantively large demands often come bundled together such that the number of demands is often correlated with the substantive scope of the claims within that bundle. As a result, examining the number of demands is a reasonable way to conceptualize demand size. To demonstrate this, it is helpful to examine the sets of demands issued by the same group at different times. Consider the following examples:
• In August 2006, the LRA made 15 demands of the government of Uganda. Among these were demands for a new constitution, a new federal system of government, a 22 percent cut of state revenue for the North, decrease in the size of the military from 100,000 to 20,000 troops and 40 percent representation in the new reduced military. They also demanded rehabilitation of many economic sectors, a unilateral government ceasefire along with a list of government stockpile locations. We can compare this bundle of demands to those made by the same group in July 2001. In that month, the LRA made 3 demands for security provisions, payments for attending peace talks and the return of all individuals rescued from LRA camps. The former bundle surely contained more consequential demands than the latter. 3 the government share the remaining 40 percent of seats with the six other groups already integrated into the army. The group also demanded the reform of other state security organizations and the reconfiguration of the judiciary. Smaller demand bundles made by the Palipehutu-FNL contained less substantively important demands for that group. In May 2000, the group demanded the return of the government to the barracks and the dismantling of pro-government militias. In February 2002, they again made two demands for the return to an older version of the state's constitution and the release of political prisoners. Neither of these sets of demands were as large in scope as the set of demands from 2006.
• The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) demanded 18 concessions in February 2002. In addition to demanding the destruction of "the government's anti-people institutions" and their replacement with a parliament (Shengo) of representatives elected at the village level, the EPRDF also demanded the right to self-determination for oppressed nations within Ethiopia, a democratic economy, abolishing and replacement of the national army, a federal system, the closure of foreign military bases as well as separation of church and state.
• The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) issued 21 demands in December 1993 including those for key government positions, like minister of foreign affairs or informations, a new transitional government with the vice president position going to the group's leader, Jonas Savimbi, and a new constitution. In addition, they demanded that their forces constitute half of the new army, and that they be integrated into the police force. The group also claimed their leaders should be accorded special privileges, and the entire group should receive immunity and financial assistance from the government. 
